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Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Explosive Ordnance Disposal


Bom disposal adalah proses yang mana alat peledak berbahaya dijinakkan dengan aman. Bom disposal adalah mencakup semua istilah untuk menggambarkan terpisah, namun fungsi saling terkait di bidang-bidang berikut:
  • Militer:

    • Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
    • Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD)
  • Keselamatan umum:

    • Public Safety Bomb Disposal (PSBD)
    • Bomb Squad

Sejarah

Perang Dunia I dan periode antar-perang

Bom Disposal menjadi praktek diformalkan dalam Perang Dunia pertama. Produksi massal yang cepat dari amunisi menyebabkan banyak cacat manufaktur, dan sebagian besar peluru yang ditembakkan oleh kedua belah pihak telah ditemukan untuk menjadi "duds".   Ini berbahaya bagi penyerang dan pembela sama. Sebagai tanggapan, Inggris mempersembahkan sebuah bagian Ordnance Ujian dari Royal Army Ordnance Corps untuk menangani masalah tumbuh.
Pada tahun 1918, Jerman mengembangkan fuzes tertunda-tindakan yang kemudian berkembang menjadi versi yang lebih canggih selama tahun 1930-an, ketika Nazi Jerman mulai saja rahasia pengembangan senjata. Tes ini menyebabkan perkembangan UXBs (bom meledak), dipelopori oleh Herbert Ruehlemann dari Rheinmetall, dan pertama kali digunakan selama Perang Saudara Spanyol 1936-37. Tertunda-tindakan semacam itu memicu teror bom di penduduk sipil karena ketidakpastian waktu, dan juga rumit tugas melucuti senjata mereka. Jerman melihat bahwa disebabkan bom meledak jauh lebih kekacauan dan gangguan dari bom yang meledak segera. Hal ini menyebabkan mereka meningkatkan penggunaan yang tertunda-aksi bom dalam Perang Dunia II.
Pada awalnya tidak ada peralatan khusus, pelatihan, atau inti pengetahuan yang tersedia, dan sebagai teknisi amunisi belajar cara aman menetralkan satu varian dari mesiu, musuh akan menambah atau mengubah bagian-bagian untuk membuat upaya netralisasi lebih berbahaya. Tren ini kucing-dan-tikus bahkan meluas sampai hari ini, dan berbagai teknik yang digunakan untuk melucuti persenjataan tidak dipublikasikan.

Perang Dunia II

Teknisi EOD modern di seluruh dunia dapat menelusuri warisan mereka ke Blitz, ketika Kerajaan Inggris 's kota-kota yang terkena serangan bom ekstensif oleh Nazi Jerman. Selain serangan udara konvensional, bom meledak (UXBs) juga mengambil korban penduduk dan moral, melumpuhkan layanan vital dan komunikasi. Bom dipasang dengan tindakan tertunda fuzes memprovokasi ketakutan dan ketidakpastian dalam penduduk sipil.
Masalah UXBs semakin rumit ketika bom pembuangan Royal Engineer personil mulai menemukan amunisi dilengkapi dengan perangkat anti-penanganan s misalnya Luftwaffe's ZUS40 anti-pencabutan murang bom tahun 1940. Bom fuzes menggabungkan perangkat anti-penanganan secara khusus dirancang untuk membunuh personel pembuangan bom. Ilmuwan dan staf teknis menanggapi dengan merancang metode dan peralatan untuk membuat mereka aman.

Irlandia Utara 1969-sekarang

Teknisi yang Amunisi dari Royal Logistic Corps (sebelumnya RAOC) telah menjadi ahli terkemuka di dunia, setelah bertahun-tahun berurusan dengan bom ditanam oleh Tentara Republik Irlandia Sementara (Pira). Pira bom yang digunakan berkisar dari bom pipa sederhana untuk korban-dipicu canggih perangkat. Bom pinggir jalan itu digunakan oleh Pira dari awal 1970-an dan seterusnya, yang berkembang dari waktu ke waktu dengan berbagai jenis bahan peledak dan pemicu.
Seorang spesialis EOD 321 unit Tentara Perusahaan (sekarang bagian dari 11 EOD Resimen RLC) telah dikerahkan untuk mengatasi IRA peningkatan kekerasan dan kemauan untuk menggunakan IEDs terhadap kedua ekonomi dan sasaran militer. Radio unit Kode panggil adalah Felix, banyak yang percaya hal ini menjadi sebuah referensi terhadap kucing dengan sembilan nyawa dan menyebabkan kalimat "Ambil Felix" setiap kali perangkat itu seorang tersangka yang ditemui dan menjadi judul buku tahun 1981 Fetch Felix; itu namun karena dengan fakta bahwa semua unit di Irlandia Utara, memiliki 'Panggilan' untuk digunakan di atas radio. 321 Sqn menjadi unit yang baru dibentuk tidak seperti Kode panggil, dan sehingga menerima sinyal muda dikirim ke OC dari 321 Sqn, KO setelah kehilangan 2 teknisi pagi itu memutuskan untuk Phoenix, untuk bangkit kembali dari abu. Ini salah dengar sebagai Felix oleh sinyal dan tidak pernah berubah. 321 EOD Coy RAOC (321 EOD Sqn sekarang RLC) adalah unik karena ini adalah yang paling dihiasi unit (dalam damai waktu) di Angkatan Darat Inggris, terutama untuk tindakan keberanian selama BANNER OP (1969-2007) di Irlandia Utara. [8]
Inggris ahli pembuangan bom 5131 (BD) Sqn RAF dan 33 Engineer Resimen RE dan 11 EOD Resimen RLC adalah antara personil pertama dikirim ke Irak pada tahun 2003 sebelum invasi itu sendiri yang sebenarnya.

Amerika Serikat sejarah EOD

Amerika Serikat Departemen Perang merasakan pengalaman Pembuangan Bom Inggris bisa menjadi aset berharga, berdasarkan laporan dari US Army, Navy, dan Marine Corps pengamat pada RAF Melksham di Wiltshire, Inggris pada tahun 1940. Tahun berikutnya, Kantor Pertahanan Sipil (OCD) dan Departemen Perang kedua mensponsori sebuah program pembuangan bom, yang perlahan-lahan jatuh di bawah pemerintahan militer karena alasan keamanan dan teknis. OCD personil terus melatih di UXB pengintaian sepanjang perang. Setelah serangan Pearl Harbor, Inggris mengirimkan instruktur ke Aberdeen Proving Ground, di mana Angkatan Darat AS akan meresmikan sebuah sekolah pembuangan bom formal di bawah Ordnance Corps.
1946 The Naval Ordnance Disposal Unit dipindahkan ke Powder Naval Pabrik di Indian Head, Md Salah satu komponen penting sekolah-sekolah itu adalah Investigasi Ordnance Lab (OIL) yang terletak di Leher Kekar Lampiran, yang bertugas untuk mengembangkan prosedur dan alat-alat standar untuk bahwa inti dari EOD profesional. Melalui pos periode perang dan nama banyak perubahan, MINYAK berevolusi untuk mengimbangi dengan semakin kompleks dan cepat berkembang biak ancaman persenjataan.
Pada bulan Mei 1941, Letnan Kolonel Geoffrey Yates (Purn) dan koleganya Inggris juga membantu mendirikan Tambang Pembuangan Naval Sekolah di Naval Gun Factory, Washington, DC Tidak mau kalah, Angkatan Laut Amerika Serikat, di bawah komando Lt Cmdr. Draper L. Kauffman (yang akan pergi ke menemukan Underwater Demolition Team s-UDTs lebih dikenal sebagai Angkatan Laut Amerika Serikat atau pasukan katak), menciptakan Pembuangan Bom Naval School di Kampus Universitas, Washington, DCUS Ordnance dan British Royal Engineers akan menempa kemitraan yang bekerja cukup efektif dalam perang - sebuah persahabatan yang bertahan sampai hari ini.
Spanduk 1942 adalah tahun untuk program EOD baru lahir. US Army Letnan Kolonel Thomas Kane, yang mulai pada tahun 1940 sebagai Instruktur Pembuangan Bom di Sekolah Pertahanan Sipil, bepergian dengan delapan tentara lain ke Inggris untuk EOD awal pelatihan. Kane mengambil alih Angkatan Darat AS Bom Pembuangan School di Aberdeen Proving Ground. Tiga anggota misi pelatihan Kane kemudian menjabat sebagai komandan pasukan Pembuangan Bom di medan perang: Ronald L. Felton (12 Bomb Disposal Squad terpisah) di Italia, Joseph C. Pilcher (ke-17 Bomb Disposal Squad terpisah) di Perancis dan Jerman, dan Richard Metress (209 Bomb Disposal Squad Pisahkan) di Kepulauan Filipina. Kapten Metress dan sebagian besar pasukannya terbunuh pada tahun 1945 ketika membongkar sebuah IED Jepang.
Akhir tahun 1942, pertama US Navy EOD korban tercatat. Ensign Howard, USNR, adalah melakukan render-prosedur yang aman terhadap tertambat Jerman tambang ketika diledakkan. Hanya beberapa bulan kemudian, dua yang pertama Angkatan Darat EOD korban jiwa terjadi selama Kampanye Kepulauan Aleut. Ketika melakukan operasi pada Attu EOD Pulau, Lt Rodger & T / Sgt. Rapp (komandan dan NCOIC ke-5 Ordnance Disposal Bomb Squad) yang fatal terluka oleh persenjataan yang tidak meledak.
Lulusan dari Sekolah Aberdeen membentuk Angkatan Darat pertama Pembuangan Bom perusahaan, dimulai dengan Bom Ordnance Disposal 231 Company. Akrab yang kini bahu lambang untuk Army EOD Teknisi, bom merah pada oval, latar belakang hitam disetujui bagi mereka untuk dipakai. Setelah penyebaran awal di Afrika Utara dan Sisilia, komandan Angkatan Darat Amerika Serikat terdaftar ketidaksetujuan mereka terhadap unit rumit ini. Pada tahun 1943, perusahaan dihilangkah, digantikan oleh mobile tujuh orang pasukan di lapangan.
Pada tahun 1944, Kolonel Thomas Kane Teater Eropa mengawasi semua operasi Pembuangan Bomb, dimulai dengan pelatihan pengintai untuk melibatkan pasukan AS Jerman pada D-Day. Sayangnya, Teater Pasifik kekurangan administrasi yang sama.
Pada tahun 1945, Angkatan Laut Pembuangan Mine Sekolah dan Naval Sekolah Pembuangan Bom dikombinasikan untuk membentuk Naval Ordnance Disposal Unit.

Secara keseluruhan, sekitar empat puluh orang Amerika tewas langsung melakukan pelayanan khusus tambang bom dan pembuangan dalam Perang Dunia II. Skor lagi yang cacat atau cedera selama operasi tempur memerlukan dukungan persenjataan. Pada Schwammanuel Bendungan di Jerman, dua regu pembuangan bom bertindak sebagai "T Force" adalah musuh terkena mortir dan tembakan senjata kecil. Kapten Marshall Crow (ke-18 Squad) mengambil luka-luka serius, bahkan sebagai pihak pembela Jerman mengemudi dari posisi mereka.
Ironisnya, satu-satunya persenjataan besar serangan terhadap daratan Amerika Serikat akan ditangani oleh Batalyon Infantri Parasut 555, yang berurusan dengan Jepang balon Fu-Go ancaman bom pada tahun 1945. Semua-555 hitam "Smokejumper s" yang dilatih oleh persenjataan personel untuk meredakan bom pembakar ini s sebelum mereka bisa membunuh warga sipil atau kebakaran hutan mulai s.
Setelah perang, AS pembuangan teknisi bom terus Nazi dan Jepang jelas stok, menghapus UXO dari medan perang, sementara negara tuan rumah pelatihan (HN) pasukan untuk melakukan tugas-tugas ini. Ini membentuk suatu tradisi untuk layanan EOD AS untuk beroperasi selama masa damai maupun perang.
Kolonel Kane tetap berhubungan dengan EOD hingga pensiun pada tahun 1955. Ia mendesak reformasi dalam pembuangan bom organisasi dan kebijakan pelatihan. Perang kesalahan yang diperbaiki pada tahun 1947 ketika personel Angkatan Darat mulai menghadiri sekolah baru di Indian Head, Maryland, di bawah US Navy arah. Kursus ini bernama Explosive Ordnance Disposal Course, mengatur pelatihan di semua jenis dasar amunisi dan proyektil.

1947 juga melihat Army Air Corps terpisah dan menjadi Angkatan Udara AS, mendapatkan EOD masing-masing cabang. Pada tahun yang sama, pendahulu dari EOD Technology Center, Biro USN Naval Senjata, diisi dengan penelitian, pengembangan, pengujian, dan evaluasi alat EOD, taktik dan prosedur dilahirkan. Resmi 1949 menandai akhir sebuah era, ketika Angkatan Darat dan Angkatan Laut Pembuangan Bom skuad yang direklasifikasi ke Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit.
Pada 1951, Angkatan Laut ditugaskan Layanan Bersama EOD tanggung jawab untuk penelitian dan pengembangan, dan pelatihan. Sebagai akibatnya, Angkatan Laut mengambil tanggung jawab untuk melatih semua operator EOD Layanan Bersama (Angkatan Darat, Korps Marinir, Angkatan Laut, dan Angkatan Udara) dan untuk pengembangan teknologi EOD mendukung EOD Layanan Bersama Komunitas.
Pada 1953, penelitian dan pengembangan tugas-tugas yang diasumsikan oleh MINYAK, yang berganti nama menjadi Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center (NAVEODTECHCEN). Mencerminkan tren perubahan nama, Naval Ordnance Disposal Unit diganti namanya Naval School Explosive Ordnance Disposal dan tetap di Naval Powder Factory. Dua tahun kemudian, Angkatan Darat Pembuangan Bom Sekolah akan menutup, sehingga satu-satunya Indian Head Layanan Bersama EOD Sekolah di AS pada waktu itu, meskipun saat ini telah dipindahkan ke NAVSCOLEOD Eglin AFB FL.
Pada tahun 1955, staf teknis NAVEODTECHCEN tumbuh untuk menyertakan insinyur sipil dan dukungan teknisi.
Pada tahun 1962, NAVEODTECHCEN ditempatkan di bawah pimpinan seorang Kmd dan kembali berganti nama menjadi Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Facility (NAVEODFAC).
Pada tahun 1971, DoD Directive 5.160,62 menugaskan Sekretaris Angkatan Laut sebagai Manajer Single Militer Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teknologi dan Pelatihan. Selanjutnya, NAVEODFAC didirikan kembali sebagai sebuah kegiatan lapangan fouth eselon di bawah Laut Sytstems Komando Angkatan Laut (NAVSEA) dan diminta untuk menyediakan penelitian dan pengembangan EOD dalam melaksanakan Sekretaris Angkatan Laut tanggung jawab untuk memenuhi teknologi EOD Layanan Gabungan persyaratan sebagaimana didefinisikan oleh Joint Layanan Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program Board.
Pada 1988, didirikan kembali sebagai NAVEODFAC Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center (NAVEODTECHCEN).
Pada tahun 1995, Angkatan Laut NAVEODTECHCEN menjadi Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV) di bawah Naval Ordnance Center (NOC).
Pada tahun 2007, NAVEODTECHDIV ini disesuaikan bawah Laut Naval Systems Command (NAVSEA) sebagai sebuah divisi dari Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC).
Saat ini, paling dikenali item khas dipakai oleh EOD Teknisi, sayang disebut sebagai "kepiting", mulai mengenakan seragam sebagai EOD Dasar Badge Kualifikasi pada tahun 1957. Badge Master tidak akan muncul sampai 1969.
Pada tanggal 31 Maret 2004, Markas Besar Angkatan Darat AS di Fort EOD Gillem, Georgia berdedikasi gedung baru untuk Kolonel Thomas J. Kane (1900-65).

EOD konflik intensitas rendah


Letusan konflik intensitas rendah s dan gelombang terorisme pada awal abad ke-21 menyebabkan perkembangan lebih lanjut dalam teknik dan metode Bomb Disposal. EOD Operator dan teknisi harus beradaptasi dengan metode-metode yang berkembang pesat membangun alat peledak improvisasi mulai dari pecahan peluru ikat pinggang yang dipenuhi bahan peledak hingga 100 kg IED biaya. Karena improvisasi bahan peledak pada umumnya tidak dapat diandalkan dan sangat tidak stabil, mereka menimbulkan risiko besar kepada publik dan terutama kepada operator EOD, mencoba untuk membuat mereka aman. Oleh karena itu, metode baru seperti yang lebih besar bergantung pada teknik-teknik terpencil, seperti kendaraan yang dioperasikan jarak jauh maju mirip dengan kereta dorong atau lapis baja Inggris bulldozer s berevolusi. Banyak negara telah mengembangkan versi mereka sendiri seperti D7 MCAP dan D9R lapis baja.
Angkatan Bersenjata Inggris telah menjadi ahli dalam pembuangan IED setelah bertahun-tahun berurusan dengan bom 'ditanam' oleh IRA. Ini datang dalam berbagai bentuk, terutama memasang bom mobil meledak melalui berbagai perintah tata krama termasuk kawat dan memicu terpencil. Dengan demikian personil pertama dikirim ke Irak pada tahun 2003 itu, antara lain, Inggris Pembuangan Bom ahli dari 11 EOD Resimen RLC.
Selama Intifadah al-Aqsa, Israel telah melucuti senjata pasukan EOD dan meledakkan bahan peledak ribuan, laboratorium ledakan bom dan amunisi (seperti roket). Dua tim EOD Israel memperoleh reputasi tinggi untuk memimpin usaha di daerah: Angkatan Darat Israel Rekayasa Corps Sayeret Yahalom dan Penjaga Perbatasan Israel wilayah Gaza-tim EOD.
Dalam Perang Irak, International koalisi pasukan multinasional di Irak telah menghadapi banyak kekuatan alat peledak improvisasi s (IEDs) di rute perjalanan. Tuduhan seperti itu dapat dengan mudah menghancurkan kendaraan ringan seperti Humvee, dan yang besar bahkan dapat menghancurkan tank tempur utama s. Side tuduhan menyebabkan banyak korban jiwa dan bersama-sama dengan bom mobil s dan s adalah pembom bunuh diri yang menyebabkan korban di Irak.
Di utara Spanyol, di mana pengeboman oleh kelompok separatis Basque umum selama tahun 1990-an, ada tiga korps bertanggung jawab atas bom pembuangan: Policia Nacional, Guardia Civil, dan Ertzaintza. Policia Nacional dan Guardia Civil hanya disebut ketika target adalah salah satu anggotanya.

Bidang operasi

EOD


Di Britania Raya, EOD Operator diadakan di semua tiga Services, yang paling terkenal sebagai teknisi Amunisi dari Royal Logistik Corps. Layanan Setiap transaksi memiliki tanggung jawab yang berbeda untuk UXO, namun mereka akan sering bekerja sama di operasi. Teknisi amunisi berurusan dengan bidang yang lebih rumit yaitu bom pembuangan bahan peledak improvisasi s (IEDs). Teknisi amunisi juga ahli kimia, biologi, pembakar, radiologis ( "bom kotor s"), dan senjata nuklir. Mereka memberikan dukungan kepada VIP s, membantu pemerintah sipil dengan masalah bom, mengajar personel dari ketiga layanan tentang keselamatan bom, dan berbagai tugas lainnya. Royal Engineers dari 33 Engineer Resimen (EOD) menyediakan dukungan EOD amunisi pada operasi konvensional. Kadang-kadang, orang bingung Engineers atau Sappers dengan Amunisi Technicians. Namun, walaupun gratis, dan sering bekerja sama, mereka memiliki keahlian yang berbeda dengan Royal Navy, RAF atau Bom RE Operator Pembuangan penanganan amunisi konvensional, Royal Engineers menghadapi dan memberikan saran pencarian aset dan Royal Logistik Corps menyediakan Explosive Device Improvised Pembuangan.
Semua calon Amunisi Teknisi menghadiri kursus meletihkan pengantar di Sekolah Angkatan Darat Amunisi dan Felix Centre, Inggris. Rentang waktu untuk Teknisi Amunisi untuk menyelesaikan semua mata kuliah yang diperlukan sebelum akhirnya ditempatkan pada sebuah tim EOD adalah sekitar 36 bulan. Sedangkan Engineer EOD periode pelatihan adalah 8 minggu.
Amunisi Teknisi, setelah menyelesaikan pelatihan mereka akan di-posting ke berbagai unit yang terlibat dalam IEDD, EOD atau biasa tugas amunisi konvensional. Sampai baru-baru ini kali EOD unit paling bergengsi di dunia adalah 321 EOD, yang kini telah dikalahkan oleh 11 EOD Resimen RLC, yang tidak hanya menyediakan semua kemampuan IEDD daratan, tetapi juga memberikan Op TELIC detasemen untuk Irak dan Afghanistan.

PSBT


US EOD mencakup baik dan menonaktifkan panggilan dasar di Amerika Serikat kecuali ada PSBT lokal atau "Keselamatan Publik Bomb Technician" yang dapat menangani IED - persenjataan hanya boleh ditangani oleh ahli EOD. Juga disebut sebagai "Teknisi Perangkat Berbahaya", biasanya PSBTs anggota Kepolisian, walaupun ada tim yang dibentuk oleh pemadam kebakaran darurat s atau lembaga manajemen.
Untuk menjadi certified, PSBTs harus menghadiri bersama Angkatan Darat Amerika Serikat-FBI Berbahaya Devices School di Redstone Arsenal, Alabama yang meniru Internasional Pelatihan IEDD sekolah di Sekolah Angkatan Darat Amunisi, dikenal sebagai Pusat Felix. Sekolah ini membantu mereka untuk menjadi pengetahuan dalam deteksi, diagnosis dan pembuangan perangkat berbahaya. Mereka dilatih lebih lanjut untuk mengumpulkan bukti dalam perangkat berbahaya, dan menghadirkan saksi ahli kesaksian di pengadilan pada kasus-kasus pengeboman.

UXO

[9]
Sebelum bom kembali berkisar dapat dimanfaatkan untuk keperluan lain, kisaran tersebut harus bersih dari semua persenjataan tidak meledak. Hal ini biasanya dilakukan oleh ahli sipil yang dilatih di lapangan, sering kali dengan dinas militer sebelum ledakan persenjataan dalam pembuangan. Teknisi ini menggunakan alat khusus untuk pemeriksaan di bawah permukaan situs. Ketika amunisi yang ditemukan, mereka aman menetralisir mereka dan menyingkirkan mereka dari situs.

Lain (pelatihan, pertambangan, kembang api)

Selain menetralkan amunisi atau IEDs, melakukan pelatihan dan menyajikan bukti, analis juga menanggapi masalah lain. Mereka membuang tua atau bahan peledak yang tidak stabil, seperti yang digunakan dalam pertambangan ing atau pertambangan, serta kembang api tua atau tidak stabil s dan amunisi. Mereka escort VIP dan pejabat. Mereka membantu polisi spesialis unit, serangan dan masuk tim dengan boobytrap deteksi dan penghindaran. Fungsi lain dari EOD Operator adalah melakukan pasca-ledakan penyelidikan. Yang EOD Operator 'pelatihan dan pengalaman dengan alat peledak improvisasi (IEDs) membuat mereka bagian integral dari setiap pengeboman penyelidikan. Bagian lain dari pekerjaan Teknisi melibatkan pemerintah mendukung unit-unit intelijen. Ini melibatkan mencari semua tempat bahwa pejabat pemerintah berpangkat tinggi atau pejabat yang dilindungi perjalanan, tinggal atau kunjungi.

Teknik


EOD umumnya membuat prosedur yang aman s (RSP) adalah jenis tradecraft dilindungi dari penyebaran umum dalam rangka untuk membatasi akses dan pengetahuan, menghilangkan musuh prosedur teknis khusus digunakan untuk membuat persenjataan yang aman atau perangkat improvisasi. Banyak teknik yang ada untuk membuat aman dari bom atau mesiu. Pemilihan teknik yang tergantung pada beberapa variabel. Variabel yang paling besar adalah kedekatan pada perangkat mesiu atau orang atau fasilitas kritis. Bahan peledak di daerah terpencil ditangani sangat berbeda dengan yang ada di daerah berpenduduk padat. Berlawanan dengan citra yang digambarkan dalam film-film modern, peran Pembuangan Bom operator adalah untuk menyelesaikan tugas sebagai jarak jauh mereka mungkin. Sebenarnya menumpangkan tangan pada bom hanya dilakukan dalam kehidupan yang sangat mengancam situasi, di mana bahaya kepada orang-orang dan struktur kritis tidak dapat dikurangi.
Amunisi Technicians memiliki banyak alat-alat untuk operasi remote, salah satunya adalah RCV, atau dikendalikan dari jauh kendaraan, juga dikenal sebagai "gerobak". Dilengkapi dengan kamera, mikrofon, dan sensor kimia, biologi, atau nuklir agen, gerobak dorong dapat membantu Teknisi mendapatkan ide yang sangat baik dari apa yang mesiu atau perangkat. Banyak robot ini bahkan s tangan-seperti dalam kasus manipulator pintu harus dibuka, atau mesiu atau bom memerlukan penanganan atau bergerak.
Gerobak yang pertama kali diciptakan oleh Letnan Kolonel 'Petrus' Miller [12] pada tahun 1972 dan digunakan oleh teknisi amunisi dalam pertempuran melawan Tentara Republik Irlandia Sementara IED's.
Juga sangat bermanfaat adalah item yang memungkinkan teknisi Amunisi untuk mendiagnosis jauh jeroan dari sebuah mesiu atau IED. Ini termasuk perangkat mirip dengan sinar-X yang digunakan oleh tenaga medis, dan kinerja tinggi sensor yang dapat mendeteksi dan membantu menginterpretasi suara, bau, atau bahkan gambar dari dalam mesiu atau bom. Setelah para teknisi menentukan apa yang mesiu atau perangkat ini, dan apa itu negara, mereka akan merumuskan suatu prosedur untuk melucuti senjata itu. Ini mungkin termasuk hal-hal yang sederhana seperti mengganti fitur keselamatan, atau sesulit yang menggunakan bahan peledak berkekuatan tinggi-actuated perangkat untuk geser, selai, mengikat, atau menghapus bagian-bagian menembak item kereta api. Lebih baik, ini akan diselesaikan secara remote, tetapi masih ada situasi ketika robot tidak akan melakukannya, dan seorang teknisi harus menempatkan risiko themself oleh pribadi akan dekat bom. Para Teknisi akan mengenakan pakaian khusus, menggunakan api dan bahan tahan fragmentasi mirip dengan rompi antipeluru s. Beberapa setelan memiliki fitur-fitur canggih seperti pendingin internal, diperkuat pendengaran, dan komunikasi kembali ke daerah kontrol. Jas ini dirancang untuk meningkatkan peluang kelangsungan hidup bagi Teknisi seharusnya mesiu atau fungsi IED saat berada di dekatnya.
Jarang, hal spesifik dari sebuah mesiu atau bom akan memungkinkan untuk pertama Technician menghapusnya dari daerah. Dalam kasus ini, sebuah kapal penahanan digunakan. Ada yang berbentuk seperti tangki air kecil, orang lain seperti bola besar s. Menggunakan metode terpencil, tempat para Teknisi item dalam wadah dan pensiun ke daerah tidak berpenghuni untuk menyelesaikan netralisasi. Karena ketidakstabilan dan kompleksitas bom modern, hal ini jarang dilakukan. Setelah mesiu atau bom telah diterjemahkan aman, para teknisi akan membantu dalam pembuangan sisa bagian sehingga wilayah dapat kembali normal. Semua ini, disebut Aman Render Prosedur, dapat mengambil banyak waktu. Karena perangkat konstruksi, masa tunggu harus diambil untuk memastikan bahwa apa pun yang memberikan metode yang aman digunakan bekerja seperti yang dimaksudkan. Sementara waktu biasanya bukan pada sisi operator EOD, bergegas biasanya berakhir dengan kekacauan.

EOD peralatan


"Pigstick" adalah istilah tentara Inggris untuk pengganggu jet air biasanya ditempatkan di gerobak dorong kendaraan yang dioperasikan dari jarak jauh terhadap bom IRA di tahun 1970-an. The pigstick adalah sebuah alat yang Menonaktifkan perangkat peledak improvisasi s (IEDs). Ini kebakaran yang eksplosif-didorong jet air untuk mengganggu sirkuit bom dan dengan demikian meniadakannya dengan risiko rendah ledakan. Pigstick modern adalah perangkat yang sangat handal dan kebakaran berkali-kali dengan sedikit pemeliharaan. Sekarang digunakan di seluruh dunia. Ini adalah tentang panjang 485 mm dan berat 3 kg. Ini adalah terbuat dari logam, dan dapat dipasang pada kendaraan yang dioperasikan dari jarak jauh (ROV). Faktor-faktor ini membuatnya sangat efektif, cara aman untuk melucuti IEDs. The "Pigstick" juga dikenal sebagai PAN (Percussion Actuated Neutralizer), atau hanya meriam air.

Sejarah

Nama "pigstick" adalah analogi yang aneh yang berasal dari kata kerja yang berarti "untuk berburu babi hutan dengan menunggang kuda dengan tombak."
Ini diciptakan untuk tentara Inggris pada tahun 1972; sebelum bom waktu itu akan dibongkar dengan tangan, yang jelas sangat berbahaya. Itu harus diadakan tiga inci (76 mm) dari IED untuk melucuti senjata itu, masih menempatkan pengguna dalam bahaya. Jadi pembuangan persenjataan peledak (EOD) operator mulai menghubungkan mereka dengan gerobak s, dan "dalam periode 1972-1978, dan dengan mempertimbangkan mesin-mesin yang telah diekspor, lebih dari 400 gerobak dorong yang hancur ketika berhadapan dengan perangkat teroris. Dalam banyak kasus, dapat diasumsikan bahwa hilangnya sebuah mesin mewakili sebuah EOD menyelamatkan hidup manusia. " [13]
The ZEUS-HLONS (HMMWV Ordnance Netralisasi Laser System), biasa dikenal sebagai ZEUS, sedang dikembangkan untuk permukaan ranjau darat dan artileri yang belum meledak (UXO) netralisasi oleh US Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV). Menggunakan daya yang moderat solid state laser komersial (SSL) dan sistem kontrol balok, terintegrasi ke dalam Humvee (HMMWV), ke permukaan jelas tambang, alat peledak improvisasi (IEDs), atau persenjataan tidak meledak (UXO) dari pasokan rute dan ladang ranjau.

Lihat pula

  • Anti-penanganan perangkat
  • Demining
  • Fuse
  • Navy EOD
  • The Hurt Locker (2009 film tentang US Army pembuangan bom-ahli di Irak)
  • Bahaya UXB (1979 Serial televisi Inggris tentang sappers Inggris selama Perang Dunia II)

Catatan dan referensi



In-line

[14]

Jenderal!


  • Samuel J. Hooper, The History of US Army Bom Pembuangan dan Explosive Ordnance Disposal (1941-1980). (Unpublished naskah) c.1981.
  • Jeffrey M. Leatherwood, Sembilan dari Aberdeen: Kolonel Thomas J. Kane dan Kejadian dari Angkatan Darat AS Pembuangan Bom di Perang Dunia II. [Tesis] Western Carolina University. Departemen Sejarah, c. 2004.
  • Christopher Ransted, Bomb Pembuangan dan Korban Inggris dari WW2, c. 2004.

Bacaan lebih lanjut

  • [15]
  • [16]
  • [17]
  • [18]
  • [19]
  • [20]
  • [21]
  • [22]
  • [23]
  • [24]
  • [25]
  • [26]

Pranala luar

[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
Bom pembuangan

Tanah perang

Layanan darurat

Mine tindakan

[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[5] ^ [3] [4]
[8] ^ [6] [7]
[12] ^ [10] [11]
HIDDEN TEXT
This section contains tooltips, titles and other text that are usually hidden in the body of the HTML page. This text should be translated to bring the entire page into your language.
HTML ATTRIBUTES
The Long Walk: Sebuah pendekatan Angkatan Darat Inggris ATO perangkat tersangka di Irlandia Utara.
Berbagai jenis persenjataan tidak meledak, dilengkapi dengan beberapa biaya pembongkaran M112 (blok persegi hitam) yang mengandung bahan peledak C4 dalam persiapan untuk kehancuran.
US Navy pembuangan persenjataan peledak (EOD) penyelam.
Andros Amerika IDF EOD robot.
Model khusus ini adalah MarkV-A1.
Seorang agen FBI dalam setelan bom melakukan misi pelatihan.
Gerobak bom dikendalikan dari jauh alat pembuangan.
Sebuah bom manipulator dari Angkatan Darat Jerman

Chapter 1: THE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CHALLENGE




CHAPTER 1
THE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CHALLENGE

This chapter implements STANAGs 2079, 2389, and 2929.

EOD service helps preserve the commander’s combat power. It enables the commander to integrate and coordinate a variety of functions to prevent degeneration of combat power at the operational and tactical levels. The challenge for EOD is to help maintain the maneuver, firepower, sustainment, and protection functions across the full range of Army operations.

THE THREAT
The strategic environment, even after the Cold War, is both dangerous and ambiguous. Increased instability in the world has resulted in regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgences, terrorist attacks, drug trafficking, and a variety of attempts at intimidation. These challenges arise even during times of relative peace. With this threat, UXO and IEDs will reduce the commander’s combat power and national political, economic, military, and informational power during OOTW.

Because of this threat, commanders at all levels must incorporate EOD support into their planning process. This will ensure commanders will be able to respond to these worldwide strategic challenges across a full range of operations as part of a joint team.

The continuing development of foreign and US high-technology munitions that disperse numerous submunitions and area denial ordnance has led to the proliferation of UXO. These munitions are available for a range of weapon systems, including artillery, ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and bombs. On the battlefield, UXO can be conventional HE; chemical, biological, or nuclear ordnance; or IEDs. UXO limits battlefield mobility, denies the use of critical assets, and threatens to injure or kill soldiers at levels unprecedented in past wars. The vast amounts of UXO found in Iraqand Kuwait during and after Operation Desert Storm testify to the increased proliferation.

All units in the Army must be able to cope with UXO on the battlefield. This calls for awareness training for all soldiers and for procedures that limit the effects of UXO on operations. Refer to FM 21-16 for more information on the UXO problem. At times, EOD units will operate jointly with other non-EOD units, other services, or allied EOD units to perform counter-UXO operations.

ARMY OPERATIONS TENETS
Five tenets of Army operations are described in FM 100-5: initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility. How EOD relates to each is described below.

Initiative

Initiative sets or changes the terms of battle by action. It implies an offensive spirit in conducting all operations. Applied to the force as a whole, it requires a constant effort to force the enemy to conform to our operational purpose and tempo while keeping our own freedom of action. Applied to individual soldiers and leaders, it requires a willingness and ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander’s intent. As in the past, EOD must excel at independent action to provide time-critical support across the entire spectrum of Army operations. EOD must anticipate requirements and act before the needs are identified at higher echelons.

Agility

Agility is friendly forces acting faster than the enemy. It is a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. Such greater quickness permits the rapid concentration of friendly strength against enemy vulnerabilities. EOD is task-organized to ensure a rapid and focused response.

Depth

Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, and resources. High technology weapons and the enemy’s capability to deliver them require EOD support throughout the theater of operations. EOD protects the commander’s freedom of action and conserves flexibility and endurance. EOD preserves operational plans and coordination by eliminating or reducing the hazards of conventional, nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions and IEDs that threaten personnel, military operations, critical facilities, materiel, and whatever else is needed to sustain combat operations.

Synchronization

Synchronization uses time, space, and resources to maximize combat power at the decisive time and place. It is both a process and a result. Synchronized activities (such as intelligence preparation, logistics, and fires) coordinated with maneuver forces lead to synchronized operations. EOD actions to neutralize the threat of conventional, nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions and IEDs serve both the synchronization process and result by providing protection, mobility, firepower, security, and intelligence. EOD actions require explicit coordination among the various units and activities participating in any operation. EOD plans its activities to quickly focus assets within other synchronized activities such as maneuver, logistics, and intelligence. EOD commanders must ensure a unity of purpose. This requires anticipation, mastery of time-space-resource relationships, and complete understanding of the ways in which friendly and enemy capabilities interact.

Versatility

Versatility is the ability to shift focus, to tailor forces, and to move from one mission to another rapidly and efficiently. It implies being multifunctional, operating across regions throughout the full range of military operations, and performing at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Versatility denotes performing in many roles during war and OOTW. It allows for the smooth transition from one mission to another. EOD is equally adept at clearing UXO from critical facilities, providing support to the US Secret Service for presidential and VIP protection, or examining, identifying, and reporting new and unusual explosive ordnance for technical intelligence purposes.

Versatility requires supported units and EOD to interface on a consistent basis. This permits the tailoring of EOD support to the supported units’ mission/function. It also fosters an understanding of each other’s capabilities and limitations.

COMBAT POWER
Commanders generate combat power using the four combat power elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership to anticipate future operations. These elements are supported by the effects of battlefield functions, tactical units, and joint operations and missions. Their effective application and sustainment with each other will decide the outcome of campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. EOD performs an important role in preserving the commander’s combat power.

Maneuver

Maneuver is the first element of combat power. It is the movement of combat forces to secure or to keep an advantageous position. Moving and positioning units during deployment to a theater and within a theater before operations are both forms of maneuver. They greatly influence the outcome of battles and campaigns. Maneuver depends upon mobility to mass forces, attain surprise, reduce vulnerability, exploit success, and preserve freedom of action. It is concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, and dominance.

The positional advantages gained by ground maneuver forces are unique to maneuver warfare. Seizing, holding, and denying terrain leads to victory and the ultimate attainment of strategic ends. Since denial of terrain limits maneuver, UXO will thus have a large impact on operations. Furthermore. the enemy will attempt its own maneuvering to get our forces into disadvantageous positions and subject to an ambush.

High technology weapons and the enemy’s capabilities to deliver them may severely restrict maneuver. In addition, the availability of ICMs has dramatically restricted maneuver on the battlefield.

EOD protects the freedom of maneuver. Teams quickly respond to assist the maneuver element by identifying, advising on, and (if necessary) neutralizing UXO. EOD can also provide technical assistance to maneuver elements, including the engineers.

The breeching of minefield is an engineer matter. The proliferation and advancing technology of area denial submunitions and scatterable mines blurs the distinction between mines and UXO. EOD units will neutralize area denial submunitions and scatterable mines (UXO). All units must be able to apply countermine warfare techniques when faced with these types of munitions. Any unit that cannot self-extract from scatterable minefield risks being fixed in place and destroyed.

Firepower

Firepower is the second element of combat power. It provides destructive force and destroys the enemy’s ability and will to fight. Our firepower facilitates maneuver by suppressing the enemy’s fires and disrupting the movement of forces. Used apart from maneuver, it can destroy, delay, or disrupt the enemy’s critical capabilities and uncommitted forces. The extended ranges and lethality of direct-fire weapons, precision-guided munitions, and accurate, massed fires make firepower devastatingly effective against troops, materiel, and facilities. Precision fires enhance our own maneuverability, while area denial fires reduce the enemy’s.

On the other hand, UXO and area denial munitions generated by enemy fires may restrict the steady supply of the proper munitions in quantities adequate to ensure that the enemy remains continuously vulnerable. To ensure that this steady flow is not hindered, EOD acts to eliminate or reduce the hazards of munitions and IEDs that threaten personnel, military operations, facilities, and materiel. EOD can also restore the commander’s firepower when dislodging a projectile stuck in an artillery tube.

Protection

Protection is the third element of combat power. Protection conserves the fighting potential of a force so that commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place. It has four components -- OPSEC and deception, soldier morale, safety, and fratricide prevention.

Operations Security. EOD counters the residual effects of enemy firepower and maneuver. EOD identifies, provides recommendations on, conducts technical intelligence for, and, if required, immediately neutralizes UXO and ICMs that threaten activities critical to maximum combat power. The enemy firepower may be enhanced and our maneuver ability diminished through the use of special operations forces or small groups trained to conduct raids against critical targets. These forces may utilize IEDs against such targets. EOD is prepared to locate, identify, and eliminate this threat.

Soldier Morale. High soldier morale means soldiers are healthy and able to maintain their fighting spirit. Tactical commanders take care of their soldier’s basic health needs and prevent unnecessary exposure to debilitating conditions. EOD service helps maintain soldier morale on the battlefield in two areas -- safety and fratricide prevention. EOD provides advice and training on UXO hazards to all soldiers. Additionally, EOD reduces or eliminates the effects of UXO wherever found.

Safety. Safety is the third component of protection, Commanders must embrace safety in all they do. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful combat operations and the preservation of combat power.

EOD ensures that safe training is performed by disposing of UXO on dedicated impact areas and temporary impact areas. During planning, EOD technicians may advise the commander of the hazards associated with maneuver through an area covered with ICMs and train his soldiers on UXO recognition and counter-UXO procedures. Technical intelligence tasks performed by EOD may provide the commander valuable insight concerning the threat of new, first-seen foreign ordnance.

Fratricide Prevention. The fourth component of protection is preventing fratricide, the unintentional killing of our own soldiers by our own fire. The power and range of modern weapons and the intensity and tempo of battle increase the likelihood of fratricide.

Limiting fratricide are strong command, disciplined operations, and detailed situational awareness. With these mechanisms, commanders can exercise positive control over fires, troop movements, and operational procedures. The key is to lower the probability of fratricide while not overly constricting boldness and audacity in combat.

The threat of fratricide increases when friendly maneuver occurs through areas where friendly fires using ICMs have deposited a blanket of UXO. All leaders and soldiers must be able to handle the threat presented by UXO. Soldiers also must be able to recognize and react to UXO that poses a threat so that EOD can eliminate or neutralize it. EOD can assist a commander in training his soldiers on identification and reaction techniques prior to deployment or mission. EOD service also helps the commander identify, provide recommendations concerning, and (if required) neutralize UXO. See FM 21-16 for more on reacting to UXO.

Leadership

The fourth and most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership. Leadership provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. The leader determines the degree to which maneuver, firepower, and protection are maximized, ensures these elements are effectively balanced, and decides how to bring them to bear against the enemy. Thus, no peacetime duty is more important for leaders than continuing to grow by studying their profession, becoming tactically and technically proficient, and preparing for war. The regular study of military doctrine, theory, and history is invaluable in this regard.

THE EOD MISSION
This section implements STANAGs 2079 and 2834.

The mission of EOD is to support national security strategy during operations, in war or OOTW, which reduce or eliminate the hazards of explosive ordnance that threatens personnel, operations, installations, or materiel.

During war, preserving the commander’s combat power becomes more challenging for EOD because of the increasingly complex and lethal battlefield. EOD integration into staff planning must be sufficiently explicit to provide for battle synchronization yet flexible enough to respond to change or to capitalize on fleeting opportunities. EOD command and control itself must respond quickly and be flexible to the rapid changes on the battlefield. UXO, to include ICMs, has greater emphasis now because of the possible critical impact on the commander’s combat power ICMs have significantly multiplied the work to be performed by EOD in order to preserve the commander’s combat power. The increased use of special forces or sabotage groups increases the need for EOD assets to eliminate the threat of IEDs at critical facilities.

EOD FUNCTIONS
Army doctrine determines the nature of the five primary EOD functions in the operations environment -- mobility, survivability, logistics, security, and intelligence. Table 1-1 lists the primary tasks under each function.





Mobility

EOD can help keep the routes of maneuver open by reducing or eliminating the hazards of UXO. EOD can also provide valuable information concerning the types of and hazards associated with UXO. This will allow the commander to make informed decisions concerning maneuver.

Survivability

On the battlefield, EOD neutralizes UXO that hinders the commander’s maneuver and increases the chance of fratricide. Range clearance operations, IED/UXO response, and realistic training scenarios reinforce this function in OOTW. Additionally, EOD can provide the commander with valuable information on the hazards associated with UXO, enabling him to make informed decisions on the protection of personnel and equipment.

Logistics

Logistics includes disposition of supplies. EOD may help with the unit training on demolition procedures for the destruction of ammunition. An EOD unit may also help with the routine destruction of ammunition stocks if there are no qualified ammunition personnel available. It may also assist in the emergency destruction of ammunition.

Security

EOD operations protect against strategic, operational, and tactical threats to US security during war as well as OOTW. The CONUS is not exempt from hostilities even during periods of relative peace. EOD provides support to the US Secret Service and the US Department of State for presidential and VIP protection. EOD service locates, identifies, and neutralizes IEDs across a wide variety of Army operations.

Intelligence

EOD provides the commander with an intelligence collection capability by examining, identifying, and reporting new and unusual explosive ordnance for technical intelligence purposes. Knowing the capabilities and lethality of enemy ordnance may be critical to the commander when planning maneuver through areas that have been covered by ICMs.

EOD ORGANIZATIONS AND STRUCTURES
In the following paragraphs, EOD organizations, their roles, and their structures are detailed. Principles on operation will also be discussed so that users of the EOD service better understand how it works.

There are three types of EOD units, each having its own mission and capabilities. The first two, the Ordnance Group (EOD) and the EOD Battalion, are command and control units. The third type of EOD unit is the Ordnance Company (EOD). This unit provides the EOD mission response. Appendix A gives more information on each of these units.

Ordnance Group (EOD)

The primary functions of this group are theater EOD planning and EOD command and control. The role, activities, and structure of this group are detailed below.

Role and Activities. This group provides command and control for two to six EOD battalions, each with 3 to 10 EOD companies (Figure 1-2). Additionally. the group provides staff planning for EOD operations throughout the entire TO, making the group EOD commander the EAC EOD staff officer.




The duties and responsibilities of the EAC EOD staff officer are important to the overall support capability of EOD. This officer advises the commander on organizing and using EOD assets. He helps establish work load priorities, but it is the theater commander’s responsibility. through his staff, to prioritize assets and operations. It is also the EOD staff officer’s responsibility to work with the unit commander’s staff to ensure that provisions for EOD support are included in all orders and other directives. Orders and directives should include such details as UXO reporting procedures and locations of EOD companies and their areas of responsibility.

The EOD staff officer plays a key role in ensuring technical intelligence from the battlefield reaches EOD units in the TO. In dealing with first-seen ordnance, the EOD staff officer ensures that command procedures are set up to screen EOD reports. He works closely with the joint. general, or staff intelligence officer (J2/G2/S2) to ensure proper handling of the materiel. He must be the point of contact for technical intelligence coordination.

The EOD command structure sets up a system to screen the EOD company’s intelligence reports for important information about munitions and ordnance ensure that intelligence efforts are not duplicated in evaluation. After prompt and reliable evaluation, the EOD community, the EOD command passes the EOD command sends the technical intelligence reports to the prop agencies for exploitation. To ensure that intelligence efforts are not duplicated in the EOD community, the EOD command passes the proper information down the chain to each EOD company.

This section implements STANAG 2143.

Structure. The Ordnance Group (EOD) directs and controls the activities of the Army’s EOD support effort. The group exercises command and control of the EOD service and special staff within a TACOM. It implements the TACOM commander’s priorities for EOD service support of operations within the theater.

The operations section is responsible for all operations, plans, training, and intelligence efforts within the group. This includes the commandwide dissemination of new developments (friendly and enemy) in munitions and the initiation and coordination of training for all personnel. including EOD and support personnel. The operations officer coordinates with the supported command’s operations officer (G3) on EOD support and routinely interfaces with senior executives from DOE, FBI, and USSS. Additionally, he conducts external evaluations of subordinate EOD commands and supervises the security and operations (S2/3) section.

EOD Battalion

The EOD battalion serves a command and control function for EOD units in the corps/TAACOM. Its role, activities, and structure are detailed below.

Role and Activities. The EOD battalion provides command and control for 3 to 10 EOD companies. An EOD battalion is allotted for each corps and TAACOM (Figure 1-1). In a fully deployed corps, the EOD battalion has ten EOD companies. In the TAACOM, the EOD battalion has eight EOD companies. The commander of the EOD battalion is the EOD staff officer for the corps or TAACOM. In the corps, the EOD battalion operates out of the COSCOM and provides a coordination team to the corps RCP. The coordination team helps the corps staff prioritize and assign categories for UXO incidents by providing technical information to the corps RCP.




Structure. The commander of an EOD battalion, as the special EOD staff officer, monitors operations and develops plans to meet the needs of the battlefield. These plans are submitted to the corps or TAACOM.

The operations section of the EOD battalion interfaces with corresponding operational levels of other units, ensures the priorities of the TAACOM/corps commander are followed, and stays aware of the status of subordinate EOD companies and the battlefield.

This section of the EOD battalion helps to coordinate and operate the reporting system at locations outside the EOD battalion. It helps establish EOD reporting procedures. troubleshoots incident reporting breakdowns, and coordinates EOD support requirements with supporting units. The section also coordinates EOD operations that are isolated from the EOD battalion. It can set up and operate a temporary field CP at critical ordnance incident sites. Finally, the section helps subordinate EOD companies get external support for their operations.

Ordnance Company (EOD)

The primary function of the EOD company is to provide support for corps and TAACOM units. It does this in a variety of ways. Its role, activities, and structure are detailed below.

Role and Activities. EOD companies support corps and TAACOM units. In the TAACOM, they provide DS missions to ASGs. EOD companies cover the ASG's area of responsibility and all units within it. In return, the ASG provides all non-EOD-specific support to the EOD company. Any EOD company not assigned to the DS support role will be tasked by the EOD battalion to provide GS to the TAACOM. EOD companies in the GS role can be collocated with the EOD battalion to protect critical CSS assets and LOC within the TAACOM.

In the corps, the companies are at the CSG and in the CSBs. Each division in the corps is supported by a CSB, which will in turn be supported by EOD. The EOD company that supports the CSB can be tasked to go forward to support operations in the division area. EOD companies not in DS to a CSB are tasked with GS responsibilities within the corps. The CSG or CSB that the EOD company supports in turn supports the company in all classes of supply, messing, billeting, and maintenance above unit level. GS EOD companies perform the following:

Augment other EOD companies when manpower and time are critical.
Perform work on high-priority incidents throughout the TAACOM or corps.
Support units and special operations in a DS role.
Whether in a TAACOM or corps, EOD companies are assigned according to the needs of the battlefield as seen by the EOD battalion commander and, ultimately, the MACOM commander. The flexibility of the EOD structure using METT-T permits the tailoring of EOD assets to support the commander’s scheme of operations.

This section implements STANAG 2389.

Structure. A fully staffed EOD company has a mix of EOD personnel and support personnel. The commander of an EOD company has command and control duties of leading the company. He must also coordinate and conduct liaison with various supported and supporting units, to include civil authorities and other government agencies. He has additional responsibility as an EOD team leader. While his primary function is to command, he must be technically qualified to perform the EOD team leader functions on any type of incident.

Each EOD company has an operations NCO. This NCO monitors EOD operations and helps the first sergeant establish and operate the CP. He can perform as an EOD response section NCO or as the EOD team leader, if required.

The EOD response team section NCO is the link between the individual response teams and the first sergeant. This NCO is responsible for all aspects of the response teams operations, maintenance, and training. He acts as the EOD heavy response team leader.

A typical EOD team is usually made up of a SSG as the team leader and one or two assistants. For nuclear incidents. the team leader must be an EOD-qualified officer. The EOD team leader performs RSPs on conventional, chemical, and biological ordnance and on IEDs. Enlisted team leaders help in the RSP on nuclear incidents as an EOD team member.

The heart of the company consists of heavy and light response teams. The light response teams can handle most conventional ordnance incidents. These teams can be detached individually for direct support to requesting units. They can operate independently from the EOD company for up to 72 hours. Additionally, several light response teams can be grouped together to work on large multi-UXO incidents or other high-priority incidents.

The EOD heavy response team augments the light response teams as necessary. This team provides special tools and equipment and augments the light team with additional manpower as needed. Situations where the EOD heavy response team would be used include:

Any incident that involves multi-EOD teams or that requires special tools and equipment or the one-of-a-kind items not normally carried by the light response teams.
Incidents involving nuclear weapons or materiel.
Chemical incidents beyond the capabilities of the light response team.
EOD LIMITATIONS
EOD units are small and have limited assets (weapons, vehicles, and personnel). This makes them highly mobile but restricts their capability for sustained operations without support. When deployed they will require support above the operator level in maintenance and in all classes of supply. This support must be provided by the units that are designated to support EOD. The only support that will come through EOD channels will be for EOD-specific tools and equipment and for replacement personnel. Additionally, EOD detachments have very limited personnel available for base security and other miscellaneous details.

EOD COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and control of EOD units depends on the geographical location of the units. The command and control structures for both CONUS and OCONUS units are described below.

CONUS
Command and control of EOD units in the CONUS is exercised by FORSCOM through the 52d Ordnance Group (EOD). The group commands four EOD battalions which in turn command all EOD companies in CONUS. The group is designated to deploy to any MRC to support operations. As such, the 52d Ordnance Group (EOD) has defacto command of all EOD units worldwide.

OCONUS
Command and control of EOD units located OCONUS is through the respective MACOMs to which the units are assigned. Under the MRC concept, HQDA has divided the world into three threat areas. These areas can be associated directly with three current JCS unified commands--MRC West in the PACOM, MRC East in CENTCOM, and MRC Europe in EUCOM. Ideally, each of these commands should have an EOD battalion assigned to the Army component command that supports them (Figure 1-2). The EOD units within the theater would then be placed under the command and control of this EOD battalion. The battalion commander would act as the theater Army EOD staff officer and ensure proper coordination with appropriate staff elements and commands.

EOD PLANNING
The scope of all military planning covers OOTW and war. The military may find itself operating in both these environments at once. All military operational planning begins with the assignment of a mission or with the commander's recognition of a requirement. It continues until the mission is accomplished. The key to successful planning are anticipation of future events and preparation for contingencies. EOD operations planning and execution must incorporate agility for not only combat missions but also those activities that happen before and after hostilities.

In the planning process EOD can assist the commander in developing a risk analysis plan for UXO that may be encountered in any type of operation. Working closely with the J2/G2 section and using METT-T, EOD can assess the enemy’s potential concerning UXO and develop plans to counter it. Additionally, EOD can advise on the UXO problems that our own friendly fires cause and then design strategies to mitigate them. With the risks identified early in the planning process, EOD can provide useful soldier training to reduce further the effects of UXO on operations.

When planning for EOD support, commanders must ensure that the most effective support is provided with the limited EOD assets available. Overall, the factors are the combat environment, the enemy, operational policies, and incident classification.

Combat Environment

Meeting the challenges of the combat environment includes human and physical considerations. These are discussed in more detail below.

Human Factor. More specifically, the human dimension deals with soldiers’ physiological and psychological needs and the challenges to leadership that these needs pose. Because EOD work is dangerous and exacting, fatigue can cause unnecessary loss of personnel and critical assets. Operational policy gives the EOD commander ultimate responsibility for the safety of the EOD response teams. During high-density work loads, the EOD commander has to rotate teams to provide rest periods for them. Supported commanders must also be aware of the connection between rest and safety. With this in mind, low-priority UXO incidents may have to wait until they can be handled safely.

Physical Factors. The physical dimension consists of three major elements: geography, weather, and infrastructure. Each of these is defined below.

Geography. In a TO, the terrain may vary significantly. In the desert, there may not be many choke points that could prevent EOD from reaching the incidents quickly. But in the desert, units can be dispersed over a large area. This may mean a long drive to reach some of the incidents. A consideration here would be the availability of aviation assets to reach some high-priority incidents quickly. The advantage of desert terrain is that its lack of population means units can easily bypass areas with heavy concentrations of UXO. Jungles and mountains cause greater restrictions on mobility. In these types of terrain, especially lacking much infrastructure, choke points can easily be exploited by using obstructions, mines, and booby traps.

Weather. Weather plays an important part in military operations. Commanders may have to tailor operations to seasonal changes to prevent weather from having a negative impact on operations. The theater climate must be a consideration in planning all operations.

Infrastructure. On a European-type battlefield, the Army will be crowded together because of the terrain and urban development. This limits mobility and, with a highly developed infrastructure (with many important facilities), UXO will have a greater impact on operations. The demand for EOD to "turn off" ordnance will be greater in any type of built-up or restricted terrain. These factors and enemy interdiction will cause many choke points, which can impact response time.

The Enemy

How well the enemy conducts operations on the battlefield will affect EOD planning. The availability of high-technology weapons and the enemy’s ability to deliver them must be integrated into EOD planning. Combine the enemy’s capabilities with the evaluation of his intentions to determine the deployment of EOD assets. Other things to consider include the following:

How effectively can the enemy launch air strikes or conduct long-range attacks with missiles, rockets, or artillery. If the enemy can, the EOD work load will be multiplied many times. With ICMs available to all the armies of the world, the UXO incident scenario has changed dramatically.
Does the enemy have special forces in place with small groups trained to conduct raids and sabotage? For example, in Viet Nam the enemy struck with terrorist methods, using IEDs in such places as restaurants and hotels. They also used sappers to infiltrate military bases with explosive charges and booby traps. The lack of technology and other resources combined with the advantage of restricting terrain would force some other countries into this situation.
Advanced technology in ordnance development has led to "smart munitions" that create an even greater hazard on the battlefield. These types of munitions are rapidly becoming available to all countries.
Operational Policies

EOD operational policies and planning will be influenced by a number of things, including enemy use of minefield, EOD coordination requirements, and EOD-specific training. These are touched upon below.

Minefields. The proliferation and advancing technology of area denial submunitions and scatterable mines complicate and blur the difference between mines and UXO. EOD units will neutralize area denial submunitions and scatterable mines (UXO) that threaten the commander’s combat power. While large-scale minefields are not specifically an EOD matter, EOD can provide technical assistance when needed. However, all units must be able to apply countermine warfare techniques when faced with these types of munitions. Any unit that cannot self-extract from scatterable minefield risks being fixed in place and destroyed. Countering area denial submunitions and scatterable mines may require support from various units along with EOD to cope with the quantity of scatterable mines expected. Refer to FM 21-16 and FM 20-32 for more information.

Procedures between EOD and other supporting units need to be established prior to war or conflict. See Chapter 2 for more information on coordinating operations.

EOD Coordination. All levels of command must coordinate with EOD staffs. EOD battalions, and EOD companies before hostilities. This will permit the establishment of a logical and systematic approach to EOD support. Giving proper consideration to the supported commander’s scheme of operations. EOD can anticipate the plan and provide the most effective support possible.

Training. EOD units must plan and train for battlefield survival. In doing so, they must remember that their mission is to preserve the commander’s combat power. EOD does this by coordinating, planning, and executing their own mobility, survivability, and intelligence functions. Planning and training should emphasize those tasks that support these functions. UXO operations and technical intelligence on foreign ordnance are the critical EOD tasks that enhance the commander’s combat power.

Because the UXO threat can be found anywhere, all soldiers have to be aware of and trained in the proper procedures to help reduce it. EOD can assist other units in this area, either by training soldiers in basic soldier skills or training leaders on how to incorporate UXO considerations in their planning.

This section implements STANAG 2143.

Incident Classification

Because there may be more UXO than available EOD response teams, incidents must first be categorized by their potential threat and then by the area commander’s priorities. Local and regional or civil defense officials estimate potential damage if items were to detonate. Since these people may not know the amount of damage that can be expected, their estimates may not be accurate. Still, local civil defense and military commanders use this information to suggest the categories and priorities to be assigned.

Categories. Command decisions categorize EOD incidents according to their potential threat. Categories may later be adjusted depending on the tactical situation. the target, any updated intelligence. or field evaluation feedback from the EOD response team on site. Incident categories established in Annex E of STANAG 2143 are as described below.

Category A. Category A UXO incidents prohibit a unit’s maneuver and mission capabilities or threaten critical assets vital to the war effort. Category A is assigned to these incidents because they constitute a grave and immediate threat. These are incidents that can cause mass destruction, widespread contamination, major reduction of combat personnel, or loss of critical installations or facilities. Category A incidents are to be given priority over all other incidents, and disposal operations are to be started immediately regardless of personal risk. This category correlates with the immediate priority of the UXO report.

Category B. Category B is assigned to EOD incidents that constitute an indirect threat. Indirect UXO incidents impair a unit’s maneuver and mission capability or threaten critical assets important to the mission. Items of technical intelligence value are normally assigned to this category. Before EOD operations are begun, a safe waiting period may be observed to reduce the hazard to EOD personnel. This category correlates with the indirect priority of the UXO report.

Category C. Category C is assigned to incidents that constitute little threat. Minor UXO incidents reduce a unit’s maneuver and mission capabilities or threaten noncritical assets of value. These incidents can normally be dealt with by EOD personnel after Category A and B incidents, as the situation permits, and with minimum hazard to personnel. The category correlates with the minor priority of the UXO report.

Category D. Category D is assigned to EOD incidents that constitute no threat at present. These UXO incidents have little or no effect on a unit’s capabilities or assets. No threat, however, does not mean that the UXO is not dangerous. It means the UXO does not threaten any critical assets important to the war effort. UXOs in this category are still deadly. These incidents may be marked and left for disposal as time permits. This category correlates with the no threat priority of the UXO report.

Priorities. Most UXO incidents are routed to a central operations center which passes the information to its supporting EOD company. In the TAACOM, this operations center is the RTOC of the ASGs. In the corps, it is the RTOC of the CSGs. The operations center sets UXO-incident priorities within its area of responsibility. Priorities are essential to keep limited EOD assets from being wasted. These priorities are then coordinated through the EOD battalion or the EOD company. UXO operations that require support from other elements. such as the engineers. are coordinated at this level.

Do not confuse categories with priorities. Categories are determined by both technical and operational considerations. Priorities are defined by operational considerations. The operations center may decide, for example, that ASPs have priority over POL storage sites because of the tactical situation. Therefore, a small projectile in an ASP posing little threat because of its size and distance from ammunition stocks would have a lower category than a large bomb with a long-delay fuze located in a POL storage area.

When there are too many incidents in a category to handle at one time, they are prioritized in order of importance. A numbering system is used. For example, Category B-10 stands for the tenth most important incident in Category B.

Wartime Operations

Today’s tempo of operations has quickened. Campaigns during peace, crisis, and war can coincide, overlap, and merge. OOTW and war itself can occur within the same TO. EOD commanders must be prepared to conduct such operations at the same time and to synchronize these seemingly disparate efforts to bring about desired results. EOD performs a wide variety of tasks across the tactical battlefield in close and rear operations and during OOTW. The EOD commander’s objective is to orchestrate all tasks to allow the supported commander to accomplish his mission.

Deployment. A key mission of today’s Army is force projection. This calls for units to be prepared for rapid worldwide deployments in response to any situation. In planning for deployments, a balance of EOD assets needs to be programmed into the flow of units to the theater. The number of EOD companies and when they are deployed will depend on the analysis of IPB and METT-T.

In CONUS, all EOD units fall under FORSCOM command. While deployed, the units fall under the command of the operational theater command. In OCONUS, EOD units that are already forward-deployed can be sent to other theaters, as they were in Operation Desert Storm.

If an EOD staff office is not already in operation, the operational theater should establish one as soon as possible. This office is to be staffed with an officer and senior NCO assistants, all of who must be EOD-qualified. The EOD staff office coordinates all EOD activities. It should be able to answer all questions regarding the deployment, utilization, and support requirements of the deployed EOD companies. The office should be established regardless of the number of detachments deployed. It is especially important if no EOD command unit, either a EOD battalion or the EOD ordnance group, is deployed. The EOD staff officer should remain as the main point of contact for all EOD activities until the EOD companies have redeployed back to their home stations.

Another operational factor to be considered is that once deploying units have been identified. they may not be able to provide all the support for OOTW missions. These missions include supporting the training bases and protecting the Army from terrorist attacks. To keep this protection going, either nondeploying EOD companies would take over or EOD Reserve and National Guard units would be activated. In a full-scale deployment, the Army might have to give up EOD support responsibility for CONUS, restricting support to critical strategic bases and assets.

Operations. EOD staffs and unit personnel should be familiar with close operations as well as rear operations. EOD support for the maneuver and survivability functions will be provided throughout the TO. UXO reports in the rear area enter EOD channels through the RTOC or the RAOC. UXO reports in the rear area behind the corps enter EOD channels through the ASG RTOC. In the corps area, UXO reports enter EOD channels through the CSB or CSG.

All EOD command headquarters manage EOD operations in their control areas. The EOD ordnance group headquarters operates the same as any group headquarters, while the EOD battalion headquarters operates like a battalion headquarters.

EOD may be tasked to help train ordnance soldiers (Ammunition Specialists) on ammunition demolition procedures. EOD may help with the routine destruction of ammunition stocks if qualified ammunition personnel are unavailable. Also, EOD may assist in the emergency destruction of ammunition to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Commanders must remember, however, that when EOD personnel are used in ammunition destruction they are being diverted from other jobs. There will be fewer response teams available to handle UXO incidents and that could impact on assets or operations. Careful review of priorities is needed to ensure the most benefit from the limited EOD assets available. EOD may also be tasked to train non-EOD soldiers, both US and allied, in ordnance recognition, safety considerations, and other related tasks dealing with UXO.

Postconflict Considerations

EOD operations continue after the conflict ends. EOD activities in support of OOTW may include intelligence, security, and logistical support. Planning in this environment will require close coordination with allied forces, other government agencies, and other military units. Battlefield cleanup roles are determined by the US command authorities.

OOTW Considerations

The above EOD missions give some of the factors that need to be examined in planning for EOD support on the battlefield, including some general considerations for OOTW. For missions that do not involve the battlefield at all, see Chapter 4.
 

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